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AMICUS ADVOCACY
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF ELEVEN
COPYRIGHT LAW PROFESSORS IN
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS V.
MICHIGAN DOCUMENT SERVICES, INC.
EDITOR'S FoREwoRD
The issue dealt with in this amici curiae brief is the judicial
ability (or inability) to take away rights granted by Congress in 17
U.S.C. § 107, the fair use doctrine.
On June 9, 1994, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, issued an opinion in
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,
granting several publishers a permanent injunction prohibiting a
commercial copying service from photocopying excerpts from
copyrighted works chosen by professors and compiled as course
packets to be used by university students in class. The court held
that such photocopying was not a fair use even though the course
packets were sold to and used by students. The defendants-
appellants have filed an appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This brief was filed by eleven
copyright professors in support of the defendants-appellants.
Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion to exclude this
amici curiae brief.
This decision continues the trend of limiting the fair use doctrine
in the context of learning and research as in Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco 37 F.3d 881 (2nd Cir. 1994).
The Supreme Court has clearly identified the nature and purpose
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of copyright and fair use in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) and Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., _ U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The amici
brief argues that the district court failed to follow these binding
precedents.
This debate is of particular interest to students and professors
who until recently have had the freedom to use copyrighted
materials in research and in classroom work, consistent with the
constitutional mandate that copyright promote learning. On a
broader scale, the decision redraws the parameters of the fair use
doctrine, with implications for other aspects of copyright law.
It should be noted that the Association of Research Libraries,
which includes 108 university based research libraries plus the
national Libraries of Canada and the United States, became a
signatory of the brief after it was filed. The National Libraries of
the United States include the Library of Congress and the National
Library of Medicine.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES'
1. Whether a copyshop is entitled to rely on a professor's fair
use right for teaching by reproduction in copies ("including
multiple copies for classroom use") when the copyshop
makes copies only at direction of the professor who provides
copy of the material to be reproduced.
2. Whether publishers can be lawfully empowered by judicial
construction of the Copyright Act to require copyshop to
serve as the publishers' licensing agent to collect license fees
from students because copyshop makes copies at request of
professors.
3. Whether denial of fair use defense to defendant copyshop
denied students the fair use privilege of using materials for
purposes of study and scholarship because copyshop, not
professors, made the copies.
1 As friends of the court, amid do not advocate the position of either party, but seek only
to provide the court with information about the law of copyright acquired through years of
study, research, and writing. Therefore, the issues in this brief are limited to those of
importance to them as professors in the interest of academic freedom, to the public as
underwriters of the educational process, and to students as beneficiaries of the preferred fair
use for teaching purposes. To the extent a tone of advocacy is in the brief, it is advocacy in
the public interest, not a party.
1994] 185
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a case of statutory construction in which an appellate
court for the first time is asked to determine whether a professor
forfeits the right of fair use to make multiple copies for classroom
use if he or she requests a copyshop to make the copies. Involved
are issues of academic freedom, educational costs, and the fair use
rights of students.
The district court determined that defendant copyshop was not
entitled to fair use, and thus that professors forfeited the right of
fair use by using the copyshop. The incongruous result is that
students do not have to pay license fees if a professor makes the
copies, but do if a copyshop makes the copies.
Although the copyshop made copies only at the request of
professors and only for classroom use, the court's rationale for
denying it the professors' right of fair use was that it charged for
providing professors this service. The copyshop, however, did not
charge for the use of the materials copied and did not receive any
money publishers were entitled to. Publishers brought this action
to obtain by judicial construction a "special private benefit," i&,e the
right to create monopoly privileges by private contract and to avoid
statutory safeguards that prevent copyright from being an unfet-
tered monopoly. If they obtain that benefit, it will enable them to
impose license fees on students for the classroom use of excerpts
made from books in the library. In granting publishers this private
benefit, however, the district court ignored relevant components of
the copyright law and acted contrary to policy extending back to the
beginning of the nation's history.
Copyright is a limited monopoly vested with a large public
interest that the district court treated as personal property. The
court thus ignored the nature of copyright as a statutory grant and
the purpose of fair use as an anti-monopolistic, anti-censorship
component of copyright law.
Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the district court applied
a bright-line rule to determine fair use and violated the two basic
principles of fair-use application: 1) a work-by-work analysis; and
2) the exclusion of uncopyrightable material in determining the
amount used. Thus the district court considered defendant's
copyright of works not in the record and may have exceeded its
186 [Vol. 2:183
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subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court by judicial construction gave plaintiff-publish-
ers a double copyright monopoly: a monopoly of the sale of books
and a monopoly of the right to reproduce excerpts from the books
after they have been sold. To protect the second monopoly, the
district court granted plaintiff-publishers a permanent copyright
injunction that protects all their works as a class. This means that
they do not have to fulfill either the constitutional or statutory
conditions for copyright. Such injunctions destroy the public
domain for literature and turn the Copyright Act into a licensing
act for publishers. But whether that Act is to be a licensing act is
for Congress, not copyright owners or courts, to determine.
This court must decide whether under the language of 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1977) professors forfeit their-or their students'-fair use
right by using copyshops to make copies for classroom use. The
ultimate question in this case, then, is whether the copyright
statute is to be interpreted with integrity for the benefit of all, or
whether it is to be interpreted without regard to coherence and
consistency so as to provide a special private benefit for a few
private interests.
1994] 187
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ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORED RELEVANT COM-
PONENTS OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN DETERMINING
THAT DEFENDANTS USE WAS NOT A FAIR USE.
The copyright statute provides: ... . [T]he fair use of a copyright-
ed work, including such use by reproduction in copies ... for
purposes such as ... teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use),. . . is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1977) (emphasis added). Although it states precisely what
defendant in this case did, the district court ignored this statutory
language.
To decide whether this was error, it is necessary to determine
what the language means. Since this is a case of first impression
at the appellate level, this court's decision on that point will not
only shape copyright law in the Sixth Circuit, but also influence the
development of that law in other circuits. The question is this: Do
professors who have a fair use right to make multiple copies for
classroom use forfeit that right if they have a copyshop make the
copies? A proper interpretation of the copyright statute requires a
negative answer.
A. The District Court Ignored Express Statutory Language that
Should Control the Disposition of this Case.
Fair use is determined not by who does the act, but the act that
is done, and [i]n construing a federal statute it is appropriate to
assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress
employed 'accurately expresses the legislative purpose'* Mills
Music, Inc. v. Snyder 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985). Therefore, why the
district court disregarded the ordinary meaning of the language of
section 107 permitting multiple copies for classroom use-without
any limitation on who may make the copies-is not clear. Appar-
ently, however, the court viewed the copyshop as making money off
the plaintiffs property. "The defendant is taking the property of
another without right or permission, using that property for
personal gain." Order, p. 5.
188 [Vol. 2:183
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The court was wrong. First, the distinction between printer and
2publisher, means that the copyshop, a printer, did not receive any
money to which publishers were entitled. The copu charges
were the same for uncopyrighted and coipyrighted material. And
the copyshop did not use the work, because the users were
professors exercising fair use rights. Lewis Galoob Toys. Inc. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992) (users
were individuals using product, not manufacturer of product).
Second, the essence of individual property is the right to exclude
use by others.' If it were private property unfettered with a public
interest, copyright would give publishers the right to exclude any
copying by anyone. This is censorship.' The court thus vested the
power of censorship in publishers by treating copyright as a private
property unfettered with a public interest and thereby making the
copyright owner's right to copy absolute. This was error. "The
monopoly privileges [of copyright] that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios. 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (Sony) (viewers may copy copyrighted motion
pictures off-the-air in their entirety). Therefore, to the extent
copyright is property, it is property vested with a public interest,
since "the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved." Id. Thus, as with public utilities,
property rights of copyright owners must be kept within the
parameters of the public interest.
The district court's Order would extend the publishers' property
interest far beyond those parameters and empower publishers to
require a copying license for teachers to use excerpts from books (or
" See, e.g., First Comics. Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc.. 884 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989).
The distinction is shown by the printer's right in sixteenth century England 'evidence that
the essential element of copyright was not the right to print, but the right to protection, once
the book was published, in order to secure the profit from the sale.' L. R. Patterson,
Copyright in Historical Perspective 51 (1968).
a *An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be absolute; if the property
is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified.' International News
Service v. Associated Press. 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
' The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing. Inc. 971 F.2d 302, 308 n.6
(9th Cir. 1992) ('A prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of ideas
without serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.').
1994] 189
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journals) for classroom teaching. However beneficial to publishers,
such a right would clearly be detrimental to the public interest. It
would mean that in addition to the purchase price for the book,
publishers would be entitled to two license fees: 1) from professors
for making the copy to be reproduced;" and 2) from the copyshop
for reproducing copies. But the publishers' goal apparently is only
to compel copyshops to become their agents to collect license fees
from students.
The irony is that this kind of power for publishers granted by
judicial construction is precisely the kind that the framers intended
to prevent Congress from granting by legislation. The copyright
clause is a limitation on, as well as a grant of, legislative power.
Thus, the language of the Copyright Clause-"The Congress shall
have Power... To Promote the Progress of Science... by securing
for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ...
Writings ... " U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.-explains why the
Supreme Court early rejected the claim that copyright statutes
protect existing property rights. Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 660 (1834) ("Congress, then, by this [copyright] act, instead of
sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.")
This limitation serves a practical purpose: It enables Congress
to impose the conditions that are necessary for copyright to
accommodate the interests of three groups--authors (who write
books), publishers (who, as assignees of authors, print and sell
books), and members of the public (who use books)-in order to
promote learning. The progress of learning thus requires a
balancing of interests, which in turn requires limited property
rights vested with a public interest, because property rights in
"ideas and information" are inimical to both learning and free
speech rights. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
589-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("to ensure the progress of
arts and sciences and integrity of First Amendment values, ideas
and information must not be freighted with claims of proprietary
right").
'Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("A
single copy is sufficient to support a claim of copyright infringement.); cfd Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947) (defendant a contributory infringer
because he selected materials for inclusion in direct infringer's motion picture).
190 [Vol. 2:183
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Fair use represents the policy against freighting ideas and
information with proprietary claims. Although it has been said to
be "'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,'" Sony.
464 U.S. at 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), Congress made
special efforts to make sure that the fair use doctrine would not be
troublesome in the educational context. Amici believe there was
only one logical reason for giving teaching a preferred fair use
status: To prevent copyright from being used to inhibit classroom
teaching, the quintessential use of copyright to fulfill its constitu-
tional purpose-the promotion of learning. This is why the
language of section 107 makes teaching a preferred fair use and
says as plainly as statutory language can that multiple copies for
classroom use is not an infringement.
The district court's disregard of plain statutory language making
teaching a preferred fair use is baffling. Apart from teaching, the
fair use doctrine is sound policy," and Congress reflected the
drafters' wisdom as well as Wheaton's ruling in giving users a
statutory right to make fair use of a copyrighted work. Moreover,
Congress emphasized the importance of the fair use right by
making it the only limitation on copyright that applies to all rights
of the copyright owner and to all copyrighted works. Even § 108,
"Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Reproduction by libraries and
archives," provides that "Nothing in this section-.. .(4) in any way
affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107." 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(f)(4) (1977) (emphasis added)."
B. The District Court Failed to Apply Recent Decisions of the
Supreme Court Relevant to the Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works.
The district court not only failed to apply the plain wording of the
copyright statute, it also failed to apply two recent Supreme Court
'The New Kids on the Block 971 F.2d at 307 n.6.
7 One must read § 108 to appreciate the significance of this point. The section not only
goes into great detail as to the scope of copying permitted by libraries and archives, it also
excludes the right of these entities to reproduce: 'a musical work, a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual
work dealing with news.* 17 U.S.C. j 108(h) (1977). Yet, Congress provided that fair use
is to override these limitations.
1994] 191
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decisions that limit the scope of copyright protection and enlarge
the right of fair use. They are: Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) [hereinafter Feisti
(white pages of telephone directories not entitled to copyright
protection because they lack originality); and Luther R. Campbell
a/k/a Luke Skvvwalker, et al. v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. _U.S._,
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) [hereinafter Acuff-Rose) (commercial parody
of popular song may be fair use).
The importance of Feist and Acuff-Rose is that they correct errors
of lower courts that had distorted the legal landscape of copyright
by misinterpreting the copyright statute. Some lower courts had
extended copyright protection to unoriginal materials, an error that
the Supreme Court in Feist corrected by repeatedly emphasizing
originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright." Other
lower courts had held that the commercial use of a work creates a
presumption that the use is not fair, which the Supreme Court in
Acuff-Rose rejected, emphasizing that fair use is to be determined
in light of all four statutory factors on a case-by-case basis.'
In correcting prior judicial errors that broadened the scope of
copyright protection and narrowed the right of fair use, the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of copyright protection unlaw-
fully granted and broadened the right of fair use unlawfully denied.
Thus, no court deciding a fair use case can afford to ignore either
Feist or Acuff-Rose because: 1) many copyrighted works contain
unoriginal materials and fair use can apply only to original
material in a copyrighted work; and 2) the determination of fair use
cannot be made with a bright-line rule and must be made on a
case-by-case, which it so say work-by-work, basis.
But having ignored the Supreme Court decisions, the district
court in this case made every error the Supreme Court rulings were
I Specifically, Feist holds that: 1) only the original components of a work can be
proteztcd by copyright, 449 U.S. 340, vassin 2) there is a constitutional right to use
unoriginal materials in a copyrighted work, id. at 349; and 3) to prove infringement a
plaintiff must prove the taking of original material. Id. at 361.
1 Specifically, Acuff-Rose: 1) rules that fair use calls for case-by-case analysis," 114 S.
Ct. at 1174; 2) in light of the purposes of copyright, id. at 1171; 3) says that courts are not
to use a bright line rule in fair use cases, id. at 1170; and 4) rejects the presumption that a
commercial use is not a fair use. Id. The court also noted that the reproduction of multiple
copies for classroom distribution is a statutory exception to the transformative use" doctrine.
Id. at 1170 n.11.
(Vol. 2:183192
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intended to prevent. Those errors culminated in the grant of a
permanent copyright injunction that protects copyrighted works
without regard to originality and destroys the right of fair use for
the works protected.
C. The District Court Failed to Apply the Law as to the Nature
and Purpose of Copyright and of Fair Use.
Had the district court understood the nature and purpose of
copyright and fair use, it surely would not have ignored Supreme
Court precedent and ruled as it did. For it would have understood
that:
1) copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly
and the duty of copyright owners not to inhibit the fair use
of copyrighted works is but a small price for the re-
ward-the exclusive right of publication-because copyright
owners have no right to preclude a reasonable use of
copyrighted works anyway. Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) [hereinafter Aikenl
("Private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts,"); and
2) fair use is the anti-monopolistic component of copyright
law to keep the statutory monopoly within constitutional
limits and who does the copying is not a factor in the fair
use analysis.10
1. Copyright is a statutory monopoly granted in the public in-
terest consisting of limited rights for a limited period of
time.
Copyright is a limited statutory monopoly granted in the public
interest that consists of limited property rights, 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1977) (Exclusive rights in copyrighted works), for a limited period
of time. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1977) (Duration of copyright). In the
I The four statutory factors to be used in analyzing fair use are: purpose of use; nature
of work; amount taken; and economic impact. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977).
1931994]
11
Patterson: Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Princet
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
words of the Supreme Court: "A copyright, like other intellectual
property, comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully
delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact
vrotections." Dowling v. United States 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985)
(emphasis added).11
Although the precisely defined interests are necessary for
copyright to accommodate the interest of three groups-authors,
publishers, and users-publishers seem to be able to convince
courts that their interests as copyright holders must prevail over
all others. A frightening example is this case, which held the
copyright owner's right to copy to be in effect absolute. This
holding, however, is contrary to Supreme Court precedent other
than the recent cases discussed. To return to an earlier point:
"The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved." Sony 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1985); cf. Fox Film Cori. v. Doval. 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
("sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly [of copyright] lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors"); United States v.
Paramount Picture, Inc. 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("copyright law
... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration"); Aiken
422 U.S. at 156 (noting that copyright is primarily to benefit public,
secondarily to benefit author). Congress agrees. "Not primarily for
the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public,
such rights are given." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. 7
(1909).
Thus, under the copyright statute, as Dowling says, the property
rights of publishers (copyright owners by assignment) are condition-
al rights subject to statutory limitations, as they must be in light
of the nature and purpose of copyright.
" These interests are five in number. They are to reproduce the work in copies, to
prepare derivative works, to distribute the work publicly, to perform the work publicly, and
to display the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977).
194 [Vol. 2:183
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2. Fair use is the anti-monopolistic, anti-censorship component
of copyright law that ensures the right of fair copying of
excerpts from copyrighted materials.
As this case demonstrates, copyright as merely another species
of property empowers copyright owners to require a license for any
copying of excerpts. This is the way copyright becomes a monopo-
listic device of censorship. For just as the power to tax a bank is
the power to destroy the bank, the power to license the use of books
is the power to censor those books.12  An example is the right of
a publisher to charge the owner of three subscriptions to a
scholarly journal (costing a total of $2484) a license fee for copying
one article for research purposes.1" Herein lies the importance of
the right to make multiple copies for classroom use. So long as this
right exists, it is a barrier to the fruition of the monopolistic and
censorship tendencies of copyright as an unfettered property right
that copyright owners seek.
Thus, as Acuff-Rose's rejection of the unlawful narrowing of fair
use indicates, fair use is the anti-monopolistic and anti-censorship
component of copyright law that protects the user's right of fair
access by fair copying, which is necessary if copyright is to promote
learning as the Constitution requires. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"It is axiomatic that learning relative to a work requires access to
the work ... This represents one of two significant policies
embodied in the Copyright Clause." Cable News Network v. Video
Monitoring Services of America, 940 F.2d 1471, 1478 n.12 (11th
Cir. 1991), reh. en banc granted, 949 F.2d 378, appeal dismissed
959 F.2d 188 (1992) [hereinafter CNN]. 14 Thus, fair use "is in
harmony with the First Amendment doctrine that free speech
" If copyright owners can require a license for a person to copy any excerpt from a book
or journal, the next step is to require a license for reading a book or journal. The agencies
for imposing this license, of course, will be rental libraries, which will replace free public
lending libraries and collect the license fees.
'
5 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.. 802 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
14No case of any other Circuit is binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit and the court
relies on such cases only for their perceptive analysis and sound reasoning. On this basis,
CNN is enormously helpful. In dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds, the Eleventh
Circuit did not question either the analysis or reasoning of Judge Birch's opinion for a
unanimous panel. Indeed, although vacated, the opinion was the subject of a prize winning
comment in 53 Ohio State L. Jour. 1155 (1992).
1994]
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encompasses 'public access to discussion, debate and dissemination
of information and ideas.'" Id. at 1479 (citations omitted).
Congress intended that copyright ensure fair access. Stewart v.
Abend. 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) ("[Copyright] Act creates a balance
between the artist's right to control the work... and the public's
need for access"); Brown v. Tabb. 714 F.2d 1088, 1092 (11th Cir.
1983) ("the limited monopoly concept of federal law represents an
attempt to strike a balance between the interest of authors in the
fruits of their labors and the interest of the public in claiming
access to material"); cf. Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d
1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that disassembly of computer
object code is fair use if disassembly is only means of access to
unprotected elements).15 Thus if fair access-however that right
is defined-requires copying, fair use becomes a synonym for fair
copying.
In this case, however, publishers have managed to diminish the
fair use doctrine (and avoid the user's right of fair copying) despite
the fact that the 1976 Act "sets limits on the scope of copyright
protection."" Indeed, the success of publishers in minimizing the
right of fair use may explain why the Supreme Court decided to
make constitutional rights a part of the fair use equation.
3. The Supreme Court has Made Constitutional Rights a Part
of the Fair Use Equation.
The Supreme Court in Feist made constitutional rights a part of
the fair use equation. Saying that "it may seem unfair that much
of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without
compensation," the Court concluded that this "is not 'some unfore-
' It should be noted that under the copyright statute, computer programs are classed as
literary works, as are books. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977) (definition of literary works); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
' Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 838. There are two tendencies that help to explain the
success of publishers in getting courts to treat a constitutional grant to authors in the public
interest as being for the publishers' primary benefit. One is the inflation-of-rights tendency,
as a result of the "natural tendency of legal rights to express themselves in absolute terms
to the exclusion of all else," which is "particularly pronounced" in copyright owners. Sony
C 464 U.S. at 432 n.13 (1984). The other is the proprietary tendency that pervades
American law with the notion that property rights are absolute. Both serve to choke off the
public's right of fair use.
196 [Vol. 2:183
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seen byproduct of a statutory scheme,'. .. it is, rather, 'the essence
of copyright,' and a constitutional requirement." Feist, 499 U.S. at
349 (cites omitted; emphasis added). The Court thus recognized
that the Copyright Clause itself contains free speech values.
Copyright owners can reasonably argue that the Court's language
in Feist refers only to unprotectable, i.e. unoriginal, material in a
compilation. But whether or not one agrees that the Supreme
Court in Feist constitutionalized fair use, the Court did constitu-
tionalize the right to use, and thus the right to copy, unoriginal
material in a copyrighted work. No one, then, can deny that
constitutional rights have now become a part of the fair use
equation. And presumably the Supreme Court made them so
because so many copyrighted works contain so much unoriginal
material that cannot constitutionally be protected by copyright.
The position of plaintiff publishers that copyright empowers them
to license the copying of excerpts from books they have sold is thus
constitutionally infirm, because it is: 1) a corruption of copyright
law; and 2) the essence of censorship. Apart from integrity in the
administration of copyright law, the only defense against both the
monopoly and censorship dangers is the fair use doctrine.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF COPYRIGHT PROVIDES
SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE,
TO PREVENT COPYRIGHT FROM BEING A HARMFUL
MONOPOLY.
Congress enacted the copyright statute, but courts interpret it.
Unfortunately, the statute is long and complex and one of its
purposes-to keep the copyright monopoly within constitutional
limits-is sometimes lost. Because courts in copyright decisions
usually speak in terms of the rights of authors, the point that is
often difficult to grasp is this: It is not the author, but the author's
assignee-the publisher-who is the monopolist. Thus, no one
author, not even the most prolific, can write enough books to create
a significant monopoly. Agatha Christie, for example, wrote dozens
of detective books and never monopolized detective fiction. But a
single publisher, if it is the assignee of its authors' copyrights and
if it is large enough, has a monopoly of profound significance.
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Moreover, publishers can and do act in concert, as they did in the
creation of the Copyright Clearance Center,17 and as they do with
the Copyright Compliance Office of the Association of American
Publishers, Inc."' and in filing this lawsuit. A copyright owned by
an author and one held by a publisher as assignee, then, have
different consequences. Owned by an author, copyright presents no
danger of a harmful monopoly; owned by a publisher, it does. This
case is a classic example, and a brief explanation of the statutory
scheme of copyright-and the place of fair use in that scheme-may
assist the court in understanding the statutory safeguards against
this danger.
There are four such safeguards. Two, the meaning of copyright
and the fair use doctrine, were discussed above. The other two are
discussed here. They are: 1) the requirement of originality, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1977); and 2) the types of copyrighted works, 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (1977).
A. Originality is a Condition Precedent for Copyright.
Originality is a condition precedent for copyright. U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Feist 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Therefore, Congress in
the 1976 Copyright Act provided that: "Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression..." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
The point here is that the requirement of originality is a
fundamental limitation to protect the public domain-as important
to learning as the creation of new works-by preventing the use of
copyright to control unoriginal material. Where the material is not
original, anyone may use it as he or she pleases. Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co.. 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.3 (9th Cir. 1970)
(non-protected material may be copied with impunity), cited in
11 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 802 F. Supp. 7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The Copyright Clearance Center is an organization of publishers that collects and distributes
licensing fees for photocopying materials registered with it. As of 1990, over 8000 publishers
had registered over 1.5 million texts with the CCC. See generally, id. at 4-9.
' See L. Patterson, Copyright and "The exclusive Right" of Authors. 1 J. Intel. Prop L.
44-48 (1993) (copyright compliance letter of American Association of Publishers sent to
alleged offending copyshop) (originally included as appendix I to this brief).
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Narell v. Freeman 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989) (in infringe-
ment action, copyright owner must prove copying of protected
elements of work.).
B. The Types of Copyrightable Works are: Predominantly
Original Works Under § 102; and Compilations and Deriva-
tive Works Under § 103.
Although originality is a constitutional requirement for copyright,
an author may satisfy the originality requirement in three different
ways: 1) by creating new works, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1977); 2) by
compiling data or preexisting works in an original manner, 17
U.S.C. § 103 (1977); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977) (definition of compila-
tion); or 3) by transforming a preexisting work into another work.
17 U.S.C. § 103 (1977); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977) (definition of deriva-
tive work).
Thus, an author may satisfy the originality requirement by
creating something new (a poem, novel or drama-an original work
of authorship under § 102); or by selecting, coordinating or arrang-
ing data or preexisting materials, in an original manner (a
directory or an anthology of stories or poems-a compilation under
§ 103); or by recasting, transforming or adapting a work into a
different work (a movie based on a novel-a derivative work also
under § 103).
1. The scope of copyright protection varies for different type
works according to their originality.
There is, however, a caveat. The less the originality, the less the
protection because the scope of copyright protection depends upon
the amount of originality in a work. Feist 449 U.S. 340, passim.
For example, the originality required for a compilation is the
selection, arrangement or coordination of data or preexisting
materials, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977) (definition of compilation); thus,
the copyright in a compilation protects these elements, but not the
preexisting data or material that is compiled. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)
(1977) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work.., and
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The
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copyright in such work is independent of ... any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.")
Because a compilation copyright protects the compilation as
such-not the preexisting materials compiled-an unauthorized
person may not reproduce and sell the compilation, V an
anthology of eighteenth and nineteenth century British dramas.
Such conduct copies the anthologist's selection, coordination or
arrangement; but a person may copy and use individual dramas
taken from the public domain, where they remain even though put
into a copyrighted work. If the individual dramas are still under
copyright (being used by permission), one who wishes to use a
drama must obtain permission from the dramatist (or one who
holds the copyright), but not from the anthologist.
The same principle applies to works that are predominantly
original. A novel is a § 102 predominantly original work entitled
to plenary copyright protection. But if the novel's hero recites a
Shakespearean sonnet to the heroine, the copyright on the novel
does not protect the sonnet.
2. The variable scope of copyright protection requires two basic
principles of fair use application: work-by-work analysis
and exclusion of unoriginal materials.
There are two basic principles in applying the fair use doctrine.
One is that it be applied on a case-by-case basis; the other is that
unoriginal material be excluded from the amount used. The
district court ignored both.
The Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose reinforced the principle that
the fair use doctrine "calls for case-by-case analysis." Acuff-Rose,
114 S. Ct. at 1170, citing "Harper & Row 471 U.S. at 560; Sony.
464 U.S. at 448, and n.31; House Report, pp. 65-66; Senate Report,
p. 62." The term case-by-case analysis, of course, is a synonym for
work-by-work analysis, for unless the analysis is applied to each of
a group of works in one case, a finding of infringement of the works
defeats the right of fair use. 19
IThe usual copyright case involves a single work, and a case-by-case analysis is thus a
work-by-work analysis. Moreover, the fact that a copyrighted work may contain unprotected
material is additional evidence that a work-by-work analysis is required.
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The other principle-that unoriginal material must be excluded
from the fair use analysis-also requires a work-by-work analysis,
for it derives from the fact that unoriginal components of a
copyrighted work cannot be protected by copyright. eist. 499 U.S.
340, Passim. This is why to determine fair use a court must
exclude unoriginal components of a work from the amount used.
See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.. 982 F.2d 693, 721 (9th
Cir. 1992) (three-step analysis to filter out unprotected material of
computer program to ensure that it remains in the public domain).
The issue, in short, is the use of a work, not a course of conduct.
The district court, however, violated both of these principles
because it relied on defendant's course of conduct in copvying
excerpts from works other than those of plaintiffs. Thus the court
characterized the copying of works in the record "as but the tip of
the iceberg" and emphasized that "the six excerpts alleged in this
case are part of a considerably larger group of 10,000 to 15,000
copyrighted excerpts copied each semester." Order, p. 3.
By treating the issue as defendant's course of conduct involving
thousands of works-rather than the use of the six works in
issue-the district court simplified its task with a bright line rule:
providing a copying service for professors precludes the fair use
defense. The court thus did precisely what the Supreme Court said
it could not: "The task [of determining fair use] is not to be
simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine
it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." Acuff-Rose 114 S. Ct.
at 1170.
This case provides an example of why the Supreme Court
protects the fair use doctrine by prohibiting the use of a bright-line
rule. The excerpts copied came from "books, journal articles,
newspaper articles, course notes or syllabi, sample test questions,
and reference to further works," Order, p. 2, that were not in the
record. The district court thus assumed that just because an
excerpt comes from a copyrighted work, the excerpt is protected by
copyright. The assumption was wrong, 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1977), but
apparently for the court was, determinative.
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C. The District Court Negated the Fair Use Doctrine as a
Safeguard against Copyright as a Harmful Monopoly.
Fair use is not unlimited. A ruling that any and all copying for
classroom use is always a fair use would be as illogical as the
district court's ruling that no copying by a copyshop for classroom
use can be a fair use.' But fair use does exist. And it exists as
a right of users to prevent copyright from becoming a harmful
monopoly.
This conclusion is warranted by the fact that the Supreme Court
in Feist narrowed the unlawfully broadened scope of copyright
protection and made constitutional rights a part of the fair use
equation; and in Acuff-Rose enlarged the unlawfully narrowed right
of fair use with four rulings: 1) Fair use requires a case-by-case
analysis; 2) courts are not to use bright line rules in deciding fair
use issues; 3) the commercial use presumption is not valid; and 4)
the four factors of § 107 are to be applied in light of the purpose of
copyright. Note 9, supra.
The significance of the district court's disregard of both Feist and
Acuff-Rose is now apparent: The district court denied professors
and students a constitutional right of access that requires copying
and is protected by eist and, it negated fair use as a safeguard to
ensure this right. Under the permanent injunction it granted,
defendants cannot make any copy of any portion of plaintiff-
publishers' works for any purpose without permission.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT USED AN IMPROPER RATIO-
NALE FOR ITS DECISION AND MAY HAVE EXCEEDED
ITS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
The district court's ratio decidendi was that 'The defendant is
taking the property of another without right or permission, using
that property for personal gain. There is simply no excuse for this
conduct." Order, p. 5. Apart from the fact that the district court
Im It is worth noting that the problem of copying a complete book will usually resolve
itself. The cost of such copying would normally equal or exceed the retail cost of the book.
Thus, no purpose would be served by expending time and energy, as well as money, to get
what could be had cheaper from the bookseller.
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ignored the limited nature of a copyright owner's property rights,
it based its conclusion not on the basis of the copying from the six
works in issue, but on the basis of the defendant's alleged copying
from thousands of other works. To add to the evidence mentioned
above: "The copying which is the subject of this litigation is but the
tip of the iceberg." Order, p. 3. The extent to which the court was
influenced by the alleged iceberg is indicated by its recitation of
figures: "25,000 coursepacks," "700 different courses," "2,900
copyrighted excerpts," "10,000 to 15,000 copyrighted excerpts." Id.
These figures represent the forbidden bright-line rule discussed
earlier, and the results of the court's ruling are obvious: Rejection
of the fair use rights of 700 professors (assuming one professor per
course) and 25,000 students (assuming one student per coursepack).
The question is not whether defendant took the property of
another, but whether a court is free to take away rights that
Congress has granted.
The emotional impact of these figures on the district judge led
her, presumably unwittingly, to override clear provisions of the
Copyright Act. This is one reason for excluding the bright line rule.
Emotion induced by irrelevant facts is a poor substitute for legal
analysis based on the law and relevant evidence. There is an
important difference, for example, between "copyrighted excerpts"
and excerpts from "copyrighted works." The difference has
important consequences. In an infringement action, the copyright
owner must prove the taking of original components, eist 449
U.S. at 361; or "protected expression." Atari Games Corp. 975 F.2d
at 837; Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465,
1472 (9th Cir. 1992).
The important point, however, is that the emotional impact of the
gross figures induced the district court to disregard four statutory
safeguards, two substantive and two procedural, that Congress
enacted to keep the copyright monopoly within the bounds that the
Constitution defines. The substantive safeguards are originality
(required by the Copyright Clause) and the fair use doctrine
(required by the First Amendment as well as the Copyright
Clause), discussed above. The procedural safeguards are subject
matter jurisdiction and standing to sue.
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A. The District Court Gave Substantive Effect to Works
Alleged to be Copyrighted But Which Were Not in the
Record.
Whether the district court in fact exceeded its subject matter
jurisdiction in considering thousands of allegedly copyrighted works
not in the record need not be decided. For even if the court did not
exceed its jurisdiction, its Order suffers from the defect of a court
that does: the substitution of emotional reaction for legal analysis,
of personal opinion for the rule of law.
The possibility that the district court did exceed its subject
matter jurisdiction, however, is based on the copyright statute,
which provides: "[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in
any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright
claim has been made in accordance with this title.. . .' 17 U.S.C.
§ 411(a) (1977).
Registration is a jurisdictional requirement.21 Unless this
provision also means that "No infringement of the copyright in any
work shall be determined for purposes of decision" by a court unless
it is registered, a jurisdictional requirement has been nullified to
a large extent. But Congress attached great significance to
registration as the House Report on the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988 shows. In support of the decision to retain
registration, the Report said:
The Committee is also concerned that abolition of section
411(a) would result in attempts to use the legal system to
exert control over materials that Congress intends to be in
the public domain....
H.R. Rep. 100-609, Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
21-22 (1988) (emphasis added).
The district court's Order in this case does what Congress
decided not to do. It eliminates § 411 for works not in issue and
assists publishers in using "the legal system to exert control over
materials that Congress intends to be in the public domain.'
" MGB Homes. Inc. v. Ameron Homes. Inc. 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir. 1990)
(registration jurisdictional prerequisite to an infringement suit.).
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B. Plaintiffs Had No Standing to Complain About the Alleged
Infringement of Copyrighted Works They Did Not Own.
The Copyright Act also uses the standing-to-sue doctrine as a
further limitation of the copyright monopoly. Only the legal or
beneficial owner may sue for an infringement of the copyright. 17
U.S.C. § 501(b) (1977); Cortner v. Israel 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1984) (applying § 501(b)). The plaintiff-publishers thus had no
standing to complain about the defendant's use of copyrighted
works other than their own. Yet, they persuaded the district court
to consider the alleged infringement of thousands of allegedly
copyrighted works owned by others to prove that the use of their
six works was unfair use.
The district court, by granting them a permanent injunction
protecting all their copyrights-present, as well as future--created
for plaintiff publishers common law copyrights, which, by relieving
them of the burden of complying with the copyright statute,
protects even uncopyrightable components of the works.
The subject-matter jurisdiction and standing-to-sue requirements,
however, are part of the statutory plan that Congress enacted with
a serious purpose: to keep the copyright monopoly within constitu-
tional bounds. Given the importance of the goal, courts should be
very careful about rulings that may serve to defeat the legislative
plan to achieve it.
IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT CONSTRUE SECTION 106(1) TO
GIVE PUBLISHERS A DOUBLE COPYRIGHT MONOPO-
LY IN VIEW OF THE LIMITATIONS ON THAT MONOPO-
LY IN SECTION 106(3).
The first effort of publishers to make copyright a double monopo-
ly was the attempt to get "an additional prerogative enabling the
[copyright] holder to restrict future sales." Sebastian International,
Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd. 847 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d Cir.
1988). The basis of the claim was that the copyright statute gave
the copyright owner the right to sell copies of the work without
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limitation.' The courts rejected this attempt, holding that the
right to vend was exhausted with the first sale, Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) ("one who has sold a copyright-
ed article, without restrictions, has parted with all right to control
the sale of it."), and thereby created the "first sale doctrine," now
codified as 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1977). See I P. Goldstein, Colvright
§ 5.6.1, p. 594 (1989).
The claim of the right to license the copying of copies that have
been sold is the first sale problem revisited. Publishers in this case
attempt to get an additional prerogative enabling them to restrict
all future copying, despite the fair use doctrine. Thus, plaintiff
publishers in this case sold the books in issue and now seek to
require a license for professors to copy any excerpt from the books
for classroom use. In claiming this right, however, the publishers
not only ignore the fair use doctrine, they rely wholly on section
106(1) and ignore section 106(3) in the grant of rights section of the
statute.
The sections say that a copyright owner has the right "(1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords," 17
U.S.C. § 106(1) (1977), and "(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords
of the copyrighted work to the Public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1(3)
(1977) (emphasis added). Under § 106(3), a copyright owner can
sell or lease copies of the copyrighted work, but not both at the
same time.
If the copyright owner sells the copy, he or she has parted with
title to, and control of, that copy. Just as "the patentee's control
over the product when it leaves his hands is sharply limited,"
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.. 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964), so is
the copyright owner's control over the book he or she has sold.
Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("a party who distributes a copyrighted work cannot
dictate how that work is to be enjoyed").
If the copyright owner leases the copy, presumably he or she or
it can require a license fee for copying the copy as part of the
license agreement. The question is whether Congress intended that
Thus, the copyright owner had the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy, and
vend the copyrighted work.' 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1977) (1909 Act.).
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the owner be able to sell the copies and then require purchasers of
the copies (or anyone else) to obtain a license to copy any excerpts.
An analysis of the statute indicates that Congress did not intend
this result. The starting point for analyzing the problem is the
difference between the work and the copy of the work, which
Congress relied on in enacting the 1976 Copyright Act. The
distinction was necessary because Congress provided copyright
protection only for the original work of authorship, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1977), not the copy (which may include unoriginal
material). The House Report explained the difference:
The definitions of these terms [copies and phonorecords] in
section 101 together with their usage in section 102 and
throughout the bill, reflect a fundamental distinction
between the 'original work' which is the product of 'au-
thorship' and the multitude of material objects in which it
can be embodied. Thus, in the sense of the bill, a 'book' is
not a work of authorship, but is a particular kind of 'copy.'
Instead, the author may write a 'literary work,' which in
turn can be embodied in a wide range of 'copies' and
'phonorecords,' including books, periodicals, computer punch
cards microfilm, tape recordings, and so forth.
House Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976).
The exclusive right to reproduce the work thus is now limited to
original material in the work by express statutory provision
consistent with constitutional requirements. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1977).
The distinction between the work and the copy, then, is impor-
tant to this case because copyright can protect only original
material and the copy may contain unoriginal material. Thus to
determine whether the copyright owner can license the copying of
the copy that has been sold it is necessary to construe the relation-
ship of 106(1) and 106(3) in light of § 102(a): Can copyright owners
have a monopoly under 106(3) for the sale of copies (books) to the
public; and also a monopoly in the form of "an additional preroga-
tive" under 106(1) to license the copying of any excerpts (including
unoriginal material) from the copies (books) sold? Note that the
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issue is not whether the copyright owner can prevent copying that
is infringement, but whether he or she or it can prevent any fair
use copying. It is this right to preclude fair use copying that makes
the right to control the copying of the copy a second monopoly.'
This court need only analyze the potential consequences of "the
additional prerogative" to determine that it should reach the same
result that courts faced with the publishers' claim to control the
resale of books reached. Those courts denied the claim of an
additional prerogative and thus denied copyright holders a double
copyright monopoly.
The effect of a double copyright monopoly under 106(1) and
106(3) is: 1) to eliminate the distinction between the work and the
copy; 2) to make the right to reproduce the work in copies absolute;
and 3) to provide copyright protection for unoriginal material and
defeat the right of fair use.
A. The Right to License Copying the Copy Eliminates the
Distinction Between the Work and the Copy.
The distinction between the work and the copy that Congress
relied on in enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, discussed above,
serves an important function. It is the basis for the distinction
between the use of the work and the use of the copyright, a
distinction courts used in creating the "first sale" doctrine: the first
sale was the use of the copyright, the resale by the purchaser was
a use of the work.2 Thus the use of the copyright is the exercise
of a right reserved to the copyright owner; the use of the work is
not.' One who translates a work makes a derivative work (17
It is worthy of note that if the right to license copying is confirmed, it will exist for the
life of the author plus fifty years or 75 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1977). Thus publishers will
be able to charge licensing fees for the same books for three generations of students.
" "In Columbia Picture Indus. v. Redd Home Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984) we
commented that section 109(a) 'is an extension of the principle that ownership of the
material object is distinct from ownership of the copyright in this material. The first sale
doctrine prevents the copyright owner from controlling the future transfer of a particular
copy once its material ownership has been transferred.' Id. at 159.* Sebastian International,
Inc. v. Consumer Contacts. 847 F.2d at 1095.
"* This distinction is based on "the separate ownership of the right of copying from that
which inheres in the mere physical control of the thing itself,* American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907), codified in 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1977), "Ownership of
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U.S.C. § 106(2) (1977) or copies the work to distribute it publicly
(17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1977)) uses the copyright, which requires the
copyright owner's permission. The question is whether one who
makes a single copy for study is using the copyright or the work.'
The Supreme Court has recognized that the making of a single copy
for personal use is fair use.2 And in the past, at least, the owner
of a book was free "to copy passages from it at will."' It is this
right to use the work that is under attack in this case.
B. The Right to License Copying the Copy Makes the Right to
Reproduce in Copies Absolute.
The copyright owner can license others to do only what it has a
right to do. Thus the right to license the copying of the copies
requires that the copyright owner have the right to copy the copies
that he or she has sold. Therefore, if publishers have the right to
license the copying of copies as they claim, they have made the
right to reproduce copies absolute. The copyright owner's right to
copy, however, is not, and cannot be, absolute so long as the
constitutional right of fair access by fair copying exists. Thus to
say that the copyright owner can grant a license to copy the copy
is to make the right to copy absolute by default. But this decision
is for Congress, not for courts.
Copyright as Distinct From Ownership of Material Object.'
" Much of the confusion about fair use exists because of the failure to distinguish the use
of the copyright and the work. That confusion would dissipate if courts recognized that fair
use relates to the use of the copyright, not the work, the use of which is a matter of personal
use. See L. Patterson & S. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright 193-200 (1991).
" Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 464 U.S. 417 (1984) allowing in-home videotaping
of copyrighted motion pictures off-the-air for later viewing is an example of personal use.
" Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888) (purchaser of copyrighted book
may use it for reference, study, reading, lending, "copying passages from it at will,' but
cannot duplicate and put it upon the market for sale; opinion by Brewer, J. of the Eighth
Circuit, appointed to U.S. Supreme Court in 1889).
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C. The Right to License Copying the Copy Provides Copyright
Protection for Unoriginal Material and Eliminates the Right
of Fair Use.
The ultimate harm of the right to license the copying of copies
results from two facts: 1) A copyright owner may have an infringe-
ment action against one who copies a work; and 2) a defendant may
have the fair use defense for the same conduct. Whether the
copying is infringement or fair use is to be decided on a work-by-
work basis.
If publishers are empowered to license the copying of any
excerpts from copies of books they have sold, it is obvious that they
will use the license to avoid the necessity of bringing infringement
actions (and of complying with either conditions, constitutional or
statutory, for copyright) and professors will have to forfeit the right
of fair use. But "just as videotaping television shows for private
home use does not implicate the copyright holder's exclusive right
to reproduction," New Kids on the Block. 971 F.2d at 307, neither
does making multiple copies of excerpts for classroom use (17
U.S.C. § 107 (1977)).
This court should follow the lead of those courts who denied the
creation of a double copyright monopoly by creating the first sale
doctrine; it should not repeat the error of those courts that
misinterpreted the copyright statute and unlawfully expanded the
copyright to protect unoriginal material and narrowed the fair use
doctrine. To give publishers the right to impose copying licenses for
copying excerpts from copies they have sold will have this effect.
The question is not whether the copyright holder is entitled to all
profits possible. As with the first sale doctrine, the ultimate
question "'is whether or not there has been such a disposition of
the copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the copyright
proprietor has received his reward for its use.'" Sebastian
International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts. 847 F.2d at 1096-97. In
short, copyright is not to be used to create profits for copyright
holders, but to protect the profit that the marketplace provides.
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER TURNS THE COPY-
RIGHT STATUTE INTO A LICENSING ACT FOR PUB-
LISHERS, A TASK FOR CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS.
This case demonstrates two immutable propositions about
publishers: 1) they continually seek to enlarge the copyright
monopoly to obtain extra benefits;2 and 2) if they cannot get what
they want from the legislature, they turn to the courts.'" In
deciding this case, then, this court should not repeat the district
court's error in failing to understand the effect of affirming that
decision: To turn the copyright statute into a licensing act for
publishers.
Congress did not give publishers the right to license the use of
books for classroom use. Therefore, they seek to persuade courts
that the Copyright Act should be construed so as to give them that
power. Such a construction, however, is contrary not only to the
language of § 107, but also to basic copyright principles. This is
demonstrated by events that apparently comprise the three
components of the publishers' plan to induce courts by judicial
construction to treat the Copyright Act as a licensing statute: 1)
the creation of a licensing system of dubious constitutionality; 2)
legal actions to get illegal permanent injunctions; and 3) a cam-
paign of disinformation directed to users.
A. A Private Licensing System Created Under Authority of the
Copyright Act for the Use of Books is of Dubious Constitu-
tionality.
The publishers have by contract created a private licensing
system, the Copyright Clearance Center."1 The twofold rationale
2 Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 n.13. For a concrete example, see the copyright notice on
WESTLAW. Federal cases are works of the U.S. Government not subject to copyright
protection. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1977). Although West Publishing says it does not claim any
copyright on U.S. Government works (as it must to make its notice effective, 17 U.S.C. § 403
(1977)), the notice goes on to say: *No part of a WESTLAW transmission may be copied...
except as permitted..." West thus disclaims copyright as it claims it.
See L Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 154-179 (1968).
§SeAmerican Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 802 F. Supp. 1, 7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
discussed at n.17, supra.
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for doing so was that: (1) courts would not recognize their right to
license without a mechanism for licensing; and (2) the licensing
system would create income and a new market and would permit
publishers to claim that any user's failure to purchase a license for
copying his or her own personal copy of a book was economically
harmful. The court's language shows that the stratagem worked:
"Plaintiffs have filed affidavits which show that permission fees are
a significant source of revenues," and concluded, 'he court finds
that if defendants' practice of refusing to seek permission before
copying and selling excerpts from copyrighted works became wide-
spread, there would be a significant loss of revenues to plaintiffs."
Order, p. 11.
This is circular reasoning. Apart from the erroneous assump-
tion-that all copying is infringement-the existence of a market
for a work does not prove that copying the work was infringement.
Lewis Galoob Toys. Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d at
968 ("the existence of a market does not, and cannot, determine
conclusively whether a work is an infringing derivative work").
To say the least, such a licensing system is of dubious constitu-
tionality: It curtails the professor's right of decision as to what
materials he or she may use in the classroom. However slight the
control, this is censorship and it should be noted that the key to
censorship is not control of what the author writes, but control of
what the press publishes, as English history shows.3 2 There are
then, two questions: First, has Congress enacted a copyright
statute to allow publishers to establish a licensing system to control
the use of books after they are sold? Second, if not, can courts
construe the copyright statute-as the district court did-to allow
publishers to establish a licensing system to control the use of
' For a detailed history of the English experience with copyright as an instrument of
censorship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see L. R. Patterson, Copyright in
Historical Perspective (1968). The events of this history are the common source of the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. The main instrument of press control was the
Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 11, c. 33, the formal title of which is instructive: "An act
for preventing Abuses in Printing Seditious, Treasonable and Unlicensed Books and
Pamphlets, and for Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses." The offense was not in the
writing, but the printing.
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published books?' These are questions this court will answer one
way or another in this case. And it should be noted that any
argument that the licensing system is okay because it is private is
wrong. It exists, and can exist, only by virtue of laws that
Congress enacts and courts enforce.
B. Copyright Injunctions Can Protect Only Works that Comply
with the Copyright Act.
Copyright injunctions that provide copyright protection for works
as a class are not legal and no amount of precedent can make them
so. The district court granted such an injunction." But such
injunctions protect all components-unoriginal as well as origi-
nal--of all plaintiffs' copyrighted works-future as well as pres-
ent-independently of the copyright statute. Thus, they "grant
monopoly privileges-by judicial construction-to those who fail to
comply with statutory safeguards intended to protect the public
against abuses of such privileges," Washingtonian Publishing Co.
v. Pearson 306 U.S. 30, 55 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting), and they
conflict "with statutory policy extending back to the beginning of
the nation's history." Id. Thus it is particularly unfortunate that
the district court did not heed this court's position as to the grant
of injunctions. "There is no power the exercise of which is more
delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing
an iniunction;...' " Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit
Tvpographical Union No. 18 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972) (em-
phasis added).
' Access is involved because the district court's Order impedes the professors' right to
give students access to the excerpts in question. The impediment exists under both the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, for the essence of both constitutional provisions
is the right of access. Judge Birch makes this point abundantly clear in his discussion of the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment in CNN. 940 F.2d 1471 at 1478-79.
" The injunction is against 'any future reproduction of any of plaintiffs' existing or future
copyrighted works," Order, p. 12. This gives the impression of requiring compliance with the
copyright statute. But under the 1976 Act, copyright comes into existence when an original
work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1977).
Therefore, the plaintiffs can ignore the copyright statute entirely, even the requirement of
registration. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1977).
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As the Supreme Court noted in Acuff-Rose, the goals of copyright
law "are not always best served by automatically granting injunc-
tive relief." Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 n.10. Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit held injunctions such as the one the district court
granted to be unlawful. CNN. 940 F.2d 1471, 1480-81. Judge
Birch's scholarly explanation of why this is so should dispose of the
issue, for as he said: "This notion [copyright injunctions to protect
future works] is manifestly contrary to the basic concepts of
copyright law and represents serious legal mischief." Id. at 1480
(emphasis added).
This mischief occurs because a court's power to grant copyright
injunctions is limited to works that comply with the copyright
statute and is to be exercised only pursuant to the copyright
statute. See Stevens v. Gladding 21 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854)
(authority to grant copyright injunctions is only by statute).'
To appreciate the depth of the mischief such injunctions inflict,
however, one must understand that a permanent injunction to
protect all books published by three publishers, as in this case, will
be precedent for injunctions that provide perpetual copyright
protection for all books published by all publishers. The result will
eventually be the destruction of the public domain with a judicially
created common law copyright, one that extends perpetual
copyright protection. With such injunctions in hand, copyright
owners need not comply with any requirements for copyright, either
constitutional or statutory.
The injunction in this case thus gives the plaintiff-publishers by
judicial construction what the Constitution prevents Congress from
giving them by statutory enactment, a special private benefit. Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The
' To see the legal infirmity of copyright injunctions to protect all books-future as well
as present-published by a single publisher as in this case, this court need only look at the
statutory and constitutional provisions that the permanent injunction negates and overrides.
With an injunction protecting future works (and present works not in the record), the
publishers can protect unoriginal works (overriding 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1977)); can protect ideas
(overriding 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977); can protect U.S. Government works (overriding 17
U.S.C. § 105 (1977)); can deny the right of fair use (overriding 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977)); and
can avoid registration of its copyrights as a prerequisite to obtaining relief for alleged
infringements. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1977).
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monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special privatebenefit.").'
C. Publishers Have Engaged in a Campaign of Disinformation
Directed to Users.
The third component of the publishers' plan is a campaign of
disinformation about copyright."7 That publishers engage in such
a campaign is not surprising. To some, indeed, this is only puffery,
a part of the free market system. The extent of the disinformation,
however, has reached the point that one with a fanciful imagination
can create a nightmare scenario the court's Order portends.
Publishers will create a copyright compliance office; will assert
the right to collect license fees for the copying of any published
work, including those that consist primarily of public domain
material (for example, British dramas of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries); will misstate the law, claiming for example,
that a district court decision (which is normally deemed not to have
precedential value) such as the one in this case means that no
copying for classroom use is permitted without payment of a
licensing fee; will demand that delinquent copyshops pay for their
sins with a private fine in an extortionate amount for the privilege
of avoiding a lawsuit.
Unfortunately, the nightmare is not fanciful. Proof exists in the
form of a letter--citing the preliminary injunction granted in this
case-sent by the Association of American Publishers' Copyright
Compliance Office to an offending copyshop, requiring inter alia.
the copyshop owner to pay $2500.00 to avoid a lawsuit. That the
The traditional argument that copyright owners make in support of such injunctions
is that they are necessary to avoid a multiplicity of suits. In view of the potent arsenal of
remedies that the copyright statute provides in addition to injunctions-impoundment,
statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and criminal sanctions this self-serving argument can
most accurately be characterized as nonsense. 17 U.S.C. §§ 503-506 (1977).
' Publishers are very adept at disinforming the public, especially with overreaching
copyright notices. See supra note 29; Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights:
Four Causes of Action' 1 J. Intell. Prop. Law 259 (1994) (showing at p. 288 claim of copyright
protection for Declaration of Independence) (originally included as Appendix II this brief).
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copyshop copied (for use in the classroom) excerpts from a book of
eighteenth and nineteenth century British dramas was apparently
deemed of no consequence, even though the works have long been
in the public domain and cannot lawfully be protected by copyright.
The letter also demanded that the copyshop owner forfeit its
constitutional right to copy unprotected material by signing an oath
not to sin again. See 1 J. Intell. Prop. Law 44-48 (1993).
The thinking of the publishers in this case is that the right to
reproduce a work in copies should be absolute so that they may
create by private contract licenses for copying excerpts from books
for classroom use.
The defect in this thinking springs from the substituting
of inference and argument for the language of the statute
and from failure to distinguish between the rights which are
given to the [copyright owner by the statute] and which he
[or she] may assert against all the world through an
infringement proceeding and rights which he [or she] may
create for himself [or herself) by private contract...
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 514 (1917).
Plaintiff-publishers have indeed confused their statutory rights
and private contract rights and have sought by private law to
extend their monopoly rights far beyond the parameters of public
interest by using copyshops to deny professors the fair use right for
teaching purposes. The district court gave the publishers its
judicial imprimatur and thereby made the copyright statute a
licensing act. But if the copyright statute is to be turned into a
licensing act for publishers, the task is one for Congress, not the
courts.
To paraphrase a recent decision of the Second Circuit:
While proprietary based arguments in favor of broad
copyright protection are perhaps attractive from a pure
policy perspective, ultimately they have a corrosive effect on
certain fundamental tenets of copyright law. If rejection of
the property arguments results in narrowing the scope of
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protection, that result flows from applying, in accordance
with Congressional intent, long-standing principles of
copyright law. This court's decision should be informed by
the concern that these fundamental principles remain undis-
torted.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir.
1992).
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
district court's judgment and rule that a professor entitled to fair
use for teaching purposes by making multiple copies for classroom
use does not lose the right merely because he or she asks a
copyshop to make the copies, so long as the copyshop charges only
for its services and not for use of the excerpts.
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